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Abstract. We develop an urban equilibrium job search model with employed
and unemployed individuals where residential mobility of the unemployed is
restricted. We assume a standard mono-centric model (firms are located in one
location), but allow for imperfect labour markets. In contrast to models with
perfect labour markets, the model predicts that the employed are only partially
compensated for commuting costs in the form of wages. As a result, rent gradients
are less steep than predicted by standard urban theories that assume perfectly
competitive labour markets.
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1 Introduction
Theories of urban residential location, which are based on perfect competitive
labour and housing markets lead to predictions that are not always consistent with
empirical evidence. We will focus here on two anomalies.
The first anomaly is that these theories predict that wages depend on workplace
location, but not on residence location, ceteris paribus (Muth 1969). Zax (1991)
argues that these theories implicitly assume that all workers at a particular work-
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place share the same residence location. Wages, given workplace, are invariant
to residence location, because residence location does not vary with workplace.
However, this is not confirmed by empirical research: there is sufficient empirical
evidence that at a particular workplace, workers’ wages depend on residence
location (for example, Zax 1991; Hazans 2004; see Kasper (1983) for a short
review), suggesting the importance of labour market imperfections (e.g., bargain-
ing power of firms) or housing market imperfections (e.g., moving costs). For
evidence of the importance of labour market imperfections, see Manning (2003).
Zax (1991) identifies the effect of commuting time on earnings for employees of
one firm located in the CBD of one city (Detroit, Michigan, USA). The research
design is unique, because in the empirical analysis the workplace locations are the
same for all employees. Zax (1991) shows that employees’ wages depend on the
residence location, essentially rejecting the assumption of a perfectly competitive
labour market, and suggests that firms have labour market power, which induces
firms to compensate employees for their commuting costs. He finds also that males
receive higher wages and more compensation than females. To the extent that
males have more labour market power, his results suggest thus that workers with
more bargaining power (e.g., due to less discrimination or more residential mobil-
ity) receive higher wages and more compensation for commuting costs.
Manning (2003) argues that the effect of residence location on wages, as for
example identified by Zax (1991), may be a result of omitted variable bias related to
the presence of unmeasured ability (see also Timothy and Wheaton 2001), since
high-ability workers commute further and also earn higher wages. Kasper (1983)
deals with this issue by employing another research design. The effect is estimated
from a sample of one city (Glasgow, in the UK), where workers are randomly
relocated within the city by a HousingAuthority. The new location of residence was
chosen by the Housing Authority, independent of location of workplace, and can be
assumed to be exogenous. Kasper (1983) demonstrates that wages respond posi-
tively to increases in the commuting costs, also for those who do not change job, and
that the increase is stronger for females than males (in contrast to the findings by Zax
(1991)). Based on an analysis of cross-section data he finds similar results (although
now the effect on the males’ earnings is higher which is in line with Zax (1991)).
Another anomaly of the theories of urban residential location is that according
to the standard theory, the price of housing services declines with the distance of
residences from the centre to induce workers to choose locations at longer com-
muting distance (Muth, 1969). Because the theory assumes that workers do not
receive compensation in the form of wages, workers receive full compensation in
the housing market. However, this form of compensation, let alone full compen-
sation, has to a large extent been empirically elusive (e.g., Dubin and Sung 1987;
Ball 1973; Söderberg and Janssen 2001). Although there are a number of reasons
why rent gradients are flatter than predicted by standard theory (e.g., variation in
income levels, multiple employment centres), this paper aims to demonstrate that
compensation in the housing market and in the labour market are mutually related
by employing a model which shows that workers at a single employment centre (in
the current paper, the Central Business District) are compensated by both wages
and rents. So, we make standard assumptions on the spatial structure of the
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economy, assume ex-ante identical individuals, but assume labour market imper-
fections. This model is essentially a variant of the urban equilibrium search model
as introduced in the literature by Wasmer and Zenou (2002). Our model takes both
labour market imperfections due to search frictions and imperfect residential
mobility and wage bargaining between workers and employers into account. The
model introduced in this paper differs from the model by Wasmer and Zenou
(2002) that assumes perfect residential mobility and predicts that workers receive
full compensation in the housing market, but no compensation in the form of
wages. Our model is similar in spirit to the equilibrium search model recently
introduced by Wasmer and Zenou (2006), with (small) positive relocation costs
and exogenous wages.
In the labour economics literature, labour market imperfections are generally
captured via search frictions (e.g., Pissarides 2000) or via efficiency wages, which
are based on the assumption that monitoring of workers is costly, so workers tend
to shirk (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Firms may reduce shirking by offering wage
surpluses, which are sufficiently high to make the threat of firing too costly for the
workers. Recently, Zenou (2002) has introduced efficiency wages in a standard
urban model with free residential mobility. In addition, he makes the additional
assumption that effort level is a decreasing function of distance, because workers
are more tired. He shows that wages are not a function of commuting distance, a
similar result as Wasmer and Zenou (2000). In a similar vein, Zenou and Smith
(1995) also demonstrate that in an urban context with free residential mobility and
efficiency wage paying firms, firms do not pay wages to compensate for the actual
commuting costs. So, evidence from the current literature indicates that labour
market imperfections are insufficient to explain the positive relationship between
wages and commuting distance in an urban market with free residential mobility.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the urban equilibrium
model is introduced and analysed. Section 3 and 4 discuss extensions and compare
the model with an equilibrium model with a different spatial structure. Section 5
concludes.
2 The basic job matching model
2.1 The job matching function
We assume a continuum of identical residences, which are homogeneously dis-
tributed over space.1 Firms are located in one location: the Central Business
District (the CBD hereafter).2 The economy is linear and closed. Each residence is
1 In a more general model, the size of the residence is optimally chosen (see, e.g., Fujita 1989). This
does not affect the (qualitative) results of the paper.
2 In our set up firms have an incentive to move away from the centre to economise on labour costs.
We consider the spatial structure as given however. So, we implicitly assume that the agglomeration
forces exceed the disagglomeration forces (Fujita and Krugman 1995). Fujita et al. (1997) relax the
assumption of a given CBD and consider an endogenously determined secondary employment centre.
In a companion paper to the current paper, we follow Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) by presuming a
homogeneous distribution of firms, which do not have any incentive to move.
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of fixed size normalised to 1 and inhabited by one individual, who is either
unemployed or employed. The size of the city is equal to N, the number of
individuals. The unemployed search for jobs, the employed do not search (for an
equilibrium model which includes on-the-job search, see Mortensen 1994). The
employed incur commuting costs t, which are proportional to distance d, so t = ad.
The commuting costs become known to the firm at the moment the unemployed
job seeker and firm contact each other, but are also known to the firm if the
employed moves residence. A firm consists of only one job, which is either filled
or unfilled. In order to fill a job, firms post a vacancy. When a firm with a vacancy
and an unemployed contact each other, the job will be filled. So, we assume that
given a contact, it is advantageous for both firms and job seekers to form a match.
The conditions under which this behaviour is optimal are derived later on.
Suppose there are L identical individuals in the labour force. We let u denote
the unemployment rate and v denote the vacancy rate, defined as number of
vacant jobs as a fraction of the labour force L. We assume the existence of a
matching function that gives the number of matches between unemployed and
firms per unit of time as a function of the number of unemployed uL looking for
jobs and the number of firms looking for workers vL. The number of matches
taking place per unit of time is given by mL = m(uL,vL). The matching function
is assumed increasing in both its arguments, concave, and has constant returns to
scale. Empirical studies generally accept the assumption of an aggregate match-
ing function with constant returns to scale, see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
The evidence from disaggregated empirical studies is not conclusive (e.g. Burda
and Profit 1996).
Given the matching function, the probability for a vacancy to be filled per unit
of time, denoted as q, is defined. Given the constant returns to scale assumption,
it follows that:
q m uL vL
vL
m
u
v
m=
( )
= ( ) = ( ), , ,1 ,1 1θ (1)
where q = v/u. So, q is a measure of labour market tightness, defined as the ratio
of the vacancy to the unemployment rate. Thus, q, the rate at which vacancies
become filled, depends negatively on the ratio of the vacancy to the unemployment
rate, q. We will assume that q goes to infinity, when q approaches zero. Similarly,
it can be seen that the rate at which unemployed become employed equals qq,
where qq depends positively on q (Pissarides 2000). Note that we assume that qq
does not depend on the location of the unemployed. Later on, we will relax this
assumption.
2.2 Employed and unemployed
An individual receives a wage w and incurs commuting costs t when employed,
and receives unemployment benefits z when unemployed. To simplify notation, we
assume that z equals zero. All individuals pay rent costs at the market price R(t)
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to absentee landowners. Note that we write R as a function of commuting
costs t, which is equivalent to writing it as a function of distance d. The commuting
costs are exogenous to the worker. In contrast, the wage is endogenous. When firm
and unemployed contact each other given the value of the commuting costs t,
firm and unemployed will bargain about the wage w, so w = w(t). Firms and
workers also continuously bargain about the wage. Hence, if the employed
moves residence and t changes, firms and employed individuals may agree on a
different wage.3 When the worker and firm do not agree on the wage, then the
individual will remain / become unemployed and the firm and individual will
continue their search. The worker will not keep the job forever. The job will be
destroyed at rate l and the worker will then become unemployed. The discount
rate is denoted as r.
Urban economic theory assumes the absence of residential moving costs
and assumes that individuals can choose their residence freely (Fujita 1989).
Although the empirical literature on residential mobility has shown that moving
costs are sufficiently high to deter residential mobility (see, among others,
Boehm 1981), this assumption can usually be justified when focusing on the
choice of the residence location. When choosing the optimal location, moving
costs are discounted over long periods, so the optimal location is hardly affected
by the presence of moving costs. This assumption is however problematic when
individuals experience changes in their characteristics over time. For example,
individuals may experience a change in income, number of children, or, as in the
current paper, in their labour market position. The absence of moving costs
implies that any change in an individual’s characteristic would induce a resi-
dential move.
In the context of the labour market, the absence of moving costs implies that
individuals move residence the moment they change their labour market status
(from employment to unemployment or from unemployment to employment, e.g.,
Wasmer and Zenou 2002). This prediction is empirically implausible. For most
individuals it is uneconomical to move residence the moment they become unem-
ployed and to move again when they become re-employed at the same workplace
location as before, because the costs of moving exceed the benefits of moving, viz.
a temporary reduction in rent (see, also Wasmer and Zenou 2006). The expected
duration of being unemployed is for most individuals only a couple of months. We
impose therefore the assumption that over their lifetime, individuals are partially
restricted to move.
We assume that employed individuals may move freely in each period follow-
ing the standard assumptions of urban economic theory, whereas we assume that
unemployed individuals do not move (so they will not bid for residences or can be
3 At face value, this assumption seems unrealistic, because most workers do not explicitly renego-
tiate the wage after a residence relocation, but it captures in essence that the level of the commuting
costs affects the bargaining position of the worker. For empirical evidence, see the study by Kasper
(1983) which studies the change in wages of workers who move residence and where the residence
occasion is randomly determined. For other indirect empirical evidence, we refer to the literature on job
mobility, job search and commuting costs, which demonstrates that workers are more likely to leave
their employer given larger commuting costs (see Manning 2003).
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outbid).4 Workers who become unemployed do not have the opportunity anymore
to move residence until they become employed again (see, similarly, DeSalvo and
Eeckhoudt 1982).5 The location of an unemployed individual is therefore deter-
mined by the location chosen the moment just before the individual becomes
unemployed.6 Hence, effectively, employed workers bid for a residence location,
realising that when they become unemployed, they will be locked in and may
reside in a non-optimal location (until they become employed again).
We denote by U(t) and W(t) the expected (discounted) lifetime income of the
unemployed and employed respectively. The lifetime income of the employed can
be written as:
rW t w t t R t U t W t W t W t
t
( ) = ( ) − − ( ) + ( ) − ( )( ) + ′( ) − ( )( )
′
λ max . (2)
Interpretation of this Bellman equation is as follows. The lifetime income of the
employed is equal to the flow of income in each period, which is equal to the net
wage (the wage minus the commuting costs), minus the rent plus the expected
change in lifetime income due to the probability of losing the job plus the expected
change in lifetime income due to moving to another location. The expected
employment duration equals 1/l. At the moment the individual becomes un-
employed, the individual may not move residence (until he/she becomes
re-employed).
We presume that search costs of the unemployed are absent (positive search
costs do not change the results fundamentally). When unemployed, the lifetime
income of the unemployed can be written as:
rU t R t q W t U t
t
( ) = − ( ) + ′( ) − ( )( )
′
θ max . (3)
Interpretation of this Bellman equation is as follows: the unemployed pays rent
equal to R(t) and has per unit of time a probability qq of becoming employed. At
the moment the unemployed becomes employed, (s)he may move to the location
with a commuting costs of value t, which maximises lifetime income W(t). The
4 This assumption can be justified in a number of ways. For example, the unemployed are more
restricted in the mortgage market, and are therefore often liquidity constrained, so they cannot bid for
other residences. In addition, the assumption that the unemployed cannot be outbid can be justified on
the grounds that contracts in the rental market are much longer than unemployment periods.
5 In DeSalvo and Eeckhoudt (1982), the urban wage is exogenously given and does not explain why
unemployment exists. Interestingly, an extension of their model may be used to obtain a relationship
between wages and commuting, although the causation is the reverse and jobs are not identical. In the
current paper, and this is essential, we assume identical jobs.
6 This assumption may be contrasted to the assumption by Wasmer and Zenou (2006) that all
individuals have to pay explicit residence costs when moving residence. They show that individuals
choose an area within the city consistent with a certain residential mobility pattern. Given this set up,
it may occur that mobile employed workers locate close to the CBD, whereas the mobile unemployed
workers locate close to the edge of the city, and the immobile (employed and unemployed) workers live
in between. The result is intuitive given low residential costs, as prevalent in the U.S. Given sizeable
residence moving costs, prevalent for workers in most West European countries (e.g., in the Nether-
lands, average monetary moving costs are about 25,000 Euro for homeowners), their model predicts
that all workers choose to be immobile ex post. Another difference is that we allow the wage to depend
on the commuting costs.
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expected unemployment duration equals 1/qq. When the unemployed does not
become employed, then (s)he will remain in the same location.
2.3 The bid rent function/optimal location
The moment the unemployed contacts an employer and decides to form a match
and hence becomes employed, a new optimal residential location may be chosen
to maximise lifetime income W(t). Competition between the employed workers
guarantees that all employed workers enjoy the same level of income, so
W(t) = W, where W denotes the equilibrium lifetime income level. An employed
worker may move to another residence location, only when outbidding other
employed workers.7 The optimal location of each worker is then determined by
the maximum land rent that the employed worker is ready to pay, the so-called
bid rent, to reach the equilibrium lifetime income level (e.g., Fujita 1989;
Wasmer and Zenou, 2002). Given equation (2), the bid rent, denoted as Y, is
equal to:
Ψ t W w t t U t r W,( ) = ( ) − + ( ) − +( )λ λ . (4)
Using equation (3), which defines the lifetime income of the unemployed, the bid
rent can be conveniently rewritten as:
Ψ t W r q
r q
w t t rW,( ) = +
+ +
( ) −( ) −θ
θ λ . (5)
Consequently, the bid rent function depends on the commuting costs t directly and
indirectly (via wages). The marginal costs that a worker is ready to pay to be
marginally closer to the CBD can be derived from the bid rent slope:
∂
∂
Ψ t W
t
r q
r q
w t
,( )
=
+
+ +
′( ) −( ) <θ
θ λ 1 0. (6)
The bid rent slope is negative (since 0 < w(t) < 1, which will be shown later on),
and, importantly, less than one (in absolute value). It can easily be seen that the
slope is equal to minus one, so workers receive full compensation in the housing
market, when l = 0 and w(t) = 0. According to (6), employed individuals are not
fully compensated for the commuting costs in the housing market, because we will
demonstrate later on that workers are partially compensated in the labour market
(w(t) > 0). This makes sense given the assumption of the presence of labour
market bargaining power. When workers have bargaining power, they will receive
compensation for commuting costs in the labour market, and, as a result, will need
less compensation in the housing market. Further, the employed worker takes into
account the likelihood to become unemployed and to stay at the same location.
7 Note that the unemployed do not relocate, so they do not bid or can be outbid.
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When unemployed, the individual will not commute to the CBD, so the employed
will bid less for a location closer to the CBD (implied by the factor (r + qq)/
(r + qq + l) < 1).
We are now ready to examine the equilibrium location of the individuals. The
market rent is given by R(t), and each employed individual takes it as an exogenous
factor. Recall that W is the equilibrium lifetime income of the employed individual
and Y(t,W) is the maximum land rent costs an employed individual is willing to
pay. Without loss of generality, we assume that the opportunity value of land is
zero. This implies that t is an optimal location if and only if R(t) = Y(t,W)  0.
This implies that the urban land rent is 0 at the city fringe, which closes the model
(because W is then determined).
Recall that we have assumed that unemployed do not bid (and cannot be
out-bidded), because their residence location is determined in a previous period
when employed. So where do the unemployed locate? Because the probability of
entering and leaving unemployment is not related to space, it follows that in
equilibrium, the spatial distribution of the unemployed in the city must be identical
to the spatial distribution of the employed so the unemployed are randomly spread
over space within the city fringe. This is consistent with our result later on derived
in section 2.7 that the unemployed rate does not depend on space. One of the
implications is that expost non-identical workers (employed and unemployed) mix
over space. Hence, although individuals are identical ex ante (ex ante it is not known
to individuals whether they will be employed or unemployed), the presence of
moving costs causes them to mix over space (see also Wasmer and Zenou, 2006).
Given (2) and (3), it follows that W - U(t) = (w(t) - t)/(r + l + qq), so
U(t) = (1 - w(t))/(r + l + qq) > 0, since it is shown later on that w(t) < 1. This
result makes sense. When unemployed, workers living closer to the CBD are
worse off, as they pay higher rents for which they are not compensated as they are
locked in. This implies, as we will see later on, that while being employed, workers
living closer to the CBD must have higher current incomes, because the lifetime
income of the employed is (assumed to be) independent of space.
2.4 Job creation
Recall that all firms are located in one location. When opening a vacancy, firms do
not know where the (next) job applicant who will fill the job is located. When firms
and unemployed contact each other and form a match, the commuting costs of the
worker are known to the firm. The value of a vacancy, V, can be written as:
rV c q J Ve= − + −( ), (7)
where c denotes the firms’ hiring costs. Vacancies are filled at rate q and Je denotes
the expectation of the job’s net worth. The job’s net worth is unknown to the firm,
because the residence location of the job applicant is unknown. However, the firm
knows the distribution of commuting costs in the urban area, so the expected job’s
net worth is known. Firms do not influence directly the residence location of the
worker.
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The value of an occupied job is equal to the productivity level, denoted as p,
minus the wage, w(t), taking into account that with a rate equal to l the job will be
destroyed. Hence, the value of the filled job occupied by a worker who resides at
t can be written as:
rJ t p w t V J t J t p w t V
r
( ) = − ( ) + − ( )( ) ( ) = − ( ) +
+
λ λλ, or, similarly, .
(8)
In equilibrium, all profit opportunities from new jobs are assumed to be exploited,
driving rents from vacant jobs to zero, so V = 0. Note that job creation occurs
based on the expected value of the filled job. This equilibrium condition deter-
mines the supply of vacancies, implying that:
J p w
r
c
q
e
e
=
−
+( ) =λ , (9)
where we denotes the expectation of the wage paid to the employee. This equation
states that the expected capitalised net return of the job is equal to the expected
value of the firm’s hiring cost. This condition is usually referred to as the job
creation condition (Pissarides 2000).
2.5 Wage determination
We assume that individuals bargain about wages with firms conditional on a
chosen residence location and therefore on the commuting costs. Unemployed are
only allowed to bargain with the firm given a job contact (which arrives at a rate
qq), whereas the employed continuously bargain with their employer. In equilib-
rium, job matches yield a local-monopoly surplus. In order to form the job match,
the unemployed individual gives up U(t) for W and the firm gives up V for J(t). We
assume that the total surplus, equal to the sum of the workers’ surplus, W - U(t),
and the firms’ surplus, J(t) - V, is shared according to the Nash solution to a
bargaining problem.
When the unemployed bargain, we employ the following rule:
w t W U t J t V( ) = − ( )( ) ( ) −( ) −argmax ,β β1 (10)
where b is a measure of the workers’ labour strength, and U(t) and V can be
interpreted as ‘threat points’. b can also be interpreted as the workers’ share of the
total surplus. Let us now focus on the employed individuals. When on-the-job
bargaining occurs, the employed individual threatens to give up W for U(t) and the
firm threatens to give up J(t) for V. This implies that the above wage bargaining
rule is identical for unemployed and employed workers (see also Pissarides 2000).
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Hence, when bargaining while employed, U(t) is the threat point at the location of
the employed individual.8 We assume that 0 < b < 1. The first-order equation
satisfies:
W U t J t V− ( ) =
−
( ) −( )ββ1 . (11)
In equilibrium V = 0, so that the wage can be written as (see Appendix 1):
w t t p c q R t R
r q
e
( ) = −( ) + + + −( ) ( ) −( )
+
1 1β β β θ β θ
θ
, (12)
where Re denotes the average rent.
Equation (12) shows that the wage depends on commuting costs t, directly
and indirectly via R(t). Interpretation of the direct effect is as follows. Condi-
tional on the commuting costs, firms and job seekers bargain about the wage.
The higher the commuting costs, the smaller is the worker’s surplus from the
match, which is equal to W - U(t), so the worker will ask (and receive) a higher
wage to be compensated for the commuting costs. This direct effect of com-
muting costs on wages depends only on the bargaining power parameter b, and
not on any other labour market variable. Further, equation (12) shows that the
wage depends positively on the rent paid in the housing market (relative to the
average rent). So, wages also compensate for the rent paid in the housing
market.
Equation (12) also shows that the wage is increasing in the productivity level
and the average hiring costs per unemployed (cq is equal to the hiring costs times
the number of vacancies divided by the number of unemployed and can be
interpreted as the average hiring costs per unemployed). Finally, note that the
current interpretation of equation (12) is partial, because R(t), but also q, Re and q
are endogenous variables.
The wage equation can also be written as (see Appendix 2):
w t t p c q t t
r q
e
( ) = −( ) + + − −( ) −( )
+ +
1 1β β β θ β β θβθ λ , (13)
where te denotes the expected commuting costs. Given the assumption of a linear
economy and the distribution of the employed over space, the expected commuting
costs is determined. Given a random distribution of employed individuals over
space within the city fringe, te = 1/2aN, where N is the number of individuals in the
city. So, keeping the expected commuting costs constant, it follows that:
8 In case that the employed individual moves from t to t, the same bargaining rule is defined at t,
so w(t) = arg max(W - U(t))b(J((t) - V)1-b which is identical to (10). Hence, although the employed
worker is indifferent with respect to the residence location (because W does not depend on t), note that
the threat point of the unemployed U(t) is location specific.
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′( ) = −( ) +( )
+ +
w t
r
r q
1 β λ
βθ λ . (14)
It follows that 0 < w(t) < 1 (because 0 < b < 1 and bqq > 0). Note that the right-
hand side of (14) does not depend on t. The commuting costs compensation in
the form of wages is positive, but partial, due to the residential lock-in effect of
moving costs. Note that all employed workers are equally well off, so in equi-
librium, wages do not compensate for commuting, but compensate for the
difference between the commuting costs and the housing rent. In a housing
market without moving restrictions, the difference is zero, but given moving
restrictions the difference is positive. Effectively, the employed take into account
that being further from the CBD increases commuting costs, which are not
fully compensated by lower rents (this will be made more explicit later on).
Hence, workers with a longer commute will bargain for a higher wage. This
can be contributed to the residential lock-in effect of the moving restrictions,
which induces them later on while being unemployed to reside in non-optimal
locations.
In most labour markets the job finding rate qq is larger than the discount r and
job-quitting rate l. Suppose a labour market with expected job durations of 6–7
years, and expected unemployment durations of 6 months, so l equals 0.15 and qq
equals 2. The annual discount rate r is usually assumed to be around 0.15.
Pissarides (2000) argues that a reasonable value of b is 0.5 (so workers and firms
have equal bargaining power), implying that the marginal compensation for com-
muting costs in the form of wage is 0.12. Thus, the model predicts that wage
compensation for commuting is sizeable, and should be empirically relevant for
the labour market.
The wage compensation for commuting depends on the chosen values of the
parameters. In a market where workers have less (more) bargaining power, the
marginal compensation in the form of wages is higher (lower). For example, when
b = 0.25, marginal compensation is 0.28; when b = 0.75, marginal compensation
is 0.07. This makes sense. Workers with more bargaining power will receive higher
wages (a larger share of the surplus), so firms will be less ‘willing’ to compensate
for the commuting costs. Consequently, according to the current bargaining model,
workers who belong to groups which are disadvantaged in the labour market (for
example, females, blacks), who have plausibly less labour market power, will
receive lower wages and will receive more compensation for the commuting costs.
This result is consistent with the panel data analysis of Kasper (1983), but incon-
sistent with the cross-section analysis of Kasper (1983) and Zax (1991).
The marginal compensation for commuting costs depends negatively on the
job-finding rate of the unemployed (given the discount and quitting rate), because
the job-finding rate determines for how long unemployed workers are locked in by
the residential moving costs. For example, keeping the assumption that b = 0.5,
but the job finding rate is 1 (so the expected unemployment duration is one year),
implies that the marginal compensation in the form of wages is 0.19. Hence, the
less rapidly the unemployed find work, the higher is the compensation.
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2.6 The bid rent slope
We have established that workers are partially compensated for the commuting
costs in the labour market. The consequences for the housing market can easily be
derived. The bid rent slope equation can be rewritten as:
∂
∂
Ψ t W
t
r q
r q
w t
r q
r q
,( )
=
+
+ +
′( ) −( ) = − +
+ +
> −
θ
θ λ β
θ
λ βθ1 1. (15)
Hence, the worker receives marginal compensation for the commuting costs in the
housing market, which is less than one (in absolute value). Presuming again that b
equals 0.5 (0.25), marginal compensation in the form of rent is 0.83 (0.67), which
is clearly less than one. The rent gradient is therefore less steep than predicted by
standard urban economics theory.9 In conclusion, the urban equilibrium job search
model predicts that workers located in the CBD receive compensation for com-
muting costs both in the housing and labour market. Given reasonable values of the
labour market parameters, the compensation in terms of rent tends to be larger than
in terms of wages.
For employed workers, the total compensation flow for commuting is typically
less than 100 percent. When the commuting costs increase by one unit,
then an employed worker’s flow income changes by − + ′( ) − ′( ) =1 w t R t
λ
θ λ
βλ
βθ λr q w t r q+ + ′( ) −( ) =
−
+ +
1 .
The change in flow income is non-positive in general, and goes to zero for
extreme values of some of the parameters. In particular, the change becomes zero
when (i) l = 0, (ii) qq → •, or (iii) b = 0. The cases (i) and (ii) imply that workers
are fully compensated when the search frictions vanish (we will see later on that
then unemployment disappears) as would happen in a frictionless competitive
labour market. Case (iii) states that when workers have no bargaining power, and
are therefore paid their reservation income, wages need to fully compensate for
commuting costs, because less than full compensation would drive net income
(wages minus commuting costs) below their reservation income.
Presuming again that b equals 0.5, total compensation flow for commuting
equals 0.94, whereas for b = 0.25 and b = 0.75, total compensation flow is almost
the same (0.95 respectively 0.94). So, roughly 5 percent of compensation for the
location does not show up in the income flow of workers, but in the income flow
of unemployed workers via lower rents in the housing market. Hence, employed
workers who live further away from their workplace are partially compensated in
the future when they are unemployed (by paying lower rents than other unem-
ployed workers who live closer to the workplace). We believe that this finding is
relevant, because it demonstrates that empirical studies that universally analyse
9 In case that unemployed and employed individuals may move freely, then the rent gradient is equal
to -1 in the area where the employed live, but may differ from -1 in the area where the unemployed
live (Wasmer and Zenou 2002). Because the employed cover about 95 percent of the total urban area
(given an unemployment rate of 5 percent), the rent gradient is for most of the area equal to -1, and for
a small part close to -1.
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workers’ income flows as a function of commuting costs focus merely on the
location of employed workers.
2.7 Equilibrium
In the steady state, the proportion of individuals who enter unemployment,
l(1 - u), must be equal to the proportion who would leave unemployment, qqu.
So, the unemployment rate does not vary over space and can be written as:
u
q
=
+
λ
λ θ . (16)
The expected wage, we, can be written (using equation (12)) as:
w t p ce e= −( ) + +1 β β β θ, (17)
where, as before, te = 1/2aN, which is determined by the size of the city N.
As can be seen above, the partial effect of expected commuting costs on the
wage is positive (keeping labour market tightness constant). In equilibrium
however, an increase in the expected commuting costs decreases labour market
tightness (and increases unemployment; the effect on vacancies is undetermined).
This can be demonstrated by incorporating the expected wage equation (17) into
the job creation condition (9):
1−( ) −( ) − +( ) =β λ β θp t r c
q
ce . (18)
Equation (18) can be solved uniquely for q given te. Given q, the equilibrium
unemployment rate u is determined (see equation (12)). So, the full equilibrium
has been defined. The overall effect of higher expected commuting costs on the
expected wage can be easily demonstrated. The wage curve is an increasing
function of labour market tightness, whereas the job creation curve implies a
negative relationship between the wage and labour market tightness. The job
creation curve does not depend on the expected commuting costs (see (9)),
whereas the expected wage curve shifts up where the job entry costs increase (see
(17)). Consequently, the overall effect of higher expected commuting costs is an
increase in the expected wage. The negative effect on labour market tightness and
therefore the positive effect on unemployment follow from the same figure (the
effect on the vacancy rate can be shown to be ambiguous).10 Finally, note that if
10 We have assumed that each contact between firm and unemployed generates a job match (see
section 2.1). This puts a limit on the maximum commuting costs and therefore on the size of the urban
area. The maximum commuting costs acceptable to the unemployed job seeker, denoted as t m, are
defined by the condition that W - U(t m) = 0. When t exceeds t m, the job seeker will reject the match.
This condition implies that J(t m) = 0, so w(t m) = p (see equation (11) and (8)) and therefore
tm = (1 - 1/2b)-1(p - bcq/(1 - b)). Hence, 1/2 N atm.
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l = 0 or qq = 0, then u = 0, so the search frictions disappear and if b = 1, then q = 0
(see (18)), so u = 1 (because employers do not open vacancies).
Recall that we have assumed that employed workers can move freely, but
unemployed workers are immobile. The model implies that unemployed workers
who become employed may move residence, but have no reason to do so. Hence,
our model outcomes are consistent with ex-post immobile employed workers, but
also with mobile employed workers, so the employed’s residential mobility rate is
not determined and is therefore consistent with any empirical residential mobility
pattern. This should be contrasted to the results by Wasmer and Zenou (2002), who
impose free mobility of unemployed workers and obtain the result that unem-
ployed and employed workers change residence when they change labour market
status (from unemployment to employment or vice versa). Our results are more in
line with Wasmer and Zenou (2006), who show that a proportion of the population
of the employed and unemployed workers does not move residence given a change
in labour market status.
3 Search and spatial mismatch
We will extend the model now by allowing for spatial search. The main reason for
such an extension is that employing equations (8) and (11), and noting that w
depends positively on t, it can be seen that W - U(t) and J(t) are both a negative
function of t and U(t) is a positive function of t. As noted above, the latter occurs
because the unemployed residing further away from the CBD pay lower rents. The
implication is that unemployed job seekers located further from the CBD are better
off and have an incentive to search less intensively than those located closer to the
CBD. To examine this issue, we extend the model by assuming the presence of
search costs, s, which vary with search intensity, s. The search intensity is opti-
mally chosen by the unemployed, and the unemployed matching probability is
assumed to be an increasing concave function of search intensity, so q > 0 and
q  0 (for a similar approach, see Wasmer and Zenou 2002). A justification of the
latter assumptions can, for example, be found in the work of Pissarides (2000). See
for similar assumptions, Smith and Zenou (2003) or Wasmer and Zenou (2006).
We assume that the cost function s is a convex function of s. Search intensity
is chosen by the unemployed worker to maximise the lifetime utility U(t, s), where
U(t, s) can be written as follows:
rU t s s R t q s W t U t s
t
, ,( ) = − ( ) − ( ) + ( ) ′( ) − ( )( )
′
σ θ max . (19)
Note that (19) extends (3), allowing for search costs s and variation in search
intensity. The worker chooses the intensity of search to maximise U(t, s). The
optimal s* satisfies:
− ′( ) + ′( ) ′( ) − ( )( ) =
′
σ θs q s W t U t s
t
* * , *max .0 (20)
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It follows that the optimally chosen s* is a negative function of t (since ∂U/∂t > 0,
s > 0 and q = 0. Hence, the unemployed residing further from the CBD will
search less intensively11 and the expected unemployment duration (equal to
1/qq(s*(t))) will be shorter for those individuals located closer to the CBD. For a
similar result, see Smith and Zenou (2003), who assume free mobility or Wasmer
and Zenou (2006).
In the steady state, the proportion of individuals at t who enter unemployment
l(1 - u(t)), must be equal to the proportion at t who leave unemployment,
qq(s*(t))u(t). So, the unemployment rate at t can be written as:
u t
q s t
( ) =
+ ( )( )
λ
λ θ * . (21)
It follows that the unemployment rate is lower for individuals residing closer to the
CBD. The reason is that in equilibrium unemployed individuals who reside closer
to the CBD pay higher rents, and search therefore more intensively for jobs. This
result provides an explanation for the positive unemployment gradient found in
some countries, for example, in the work of Vipond (1980, 1984).
Wasmer and Zenou (2000) point out that in the case that the unemployed also
have to travel to the CBD, then the unemployed may reside close to jobs when
these costs are relatively high. Given this assumption, it can be easily demon-
strated that our paper would imply a negative unemployment gradient as reported
for most cities in the United States. Hence, our results should be interpreted more
generally as to confirm previous theoretical and empirical results in the mismatch
literature which show that bad job access worsens employment opportunities,
because the unemployed residing further away from employment centres will
search less intensively for jobs (Holzer 1991; Smith and Zenou 2003).
4 Spatial structure and compensation
In the empirical urban economics literature, the extent to which workers are
compensated for commuting costs has extensively been investigated (starting with
Muth 1969). Far less attention has been given to the implications of urban structure
for compensation.
Above we have presumed that all firms are located in the CBD. Let us therefore
compare results derived above with the results of a similar labour market model
but where a continuum of identical firms are homogeneously distributed over
space. So spatial variations in rents are absent, which characterises a non-urban
area (see Van Ommeren and Rietveld 2005). In this case, the wage equation,
similar to (12), can be written as: w(t) = (1 - b)t + bp + bcq. So, the marginal
compensation for commuting costs in the form of wages in non-urban areas is
equal to 1 - b, which exceeds the marginal compensation in urban areas (see (14)).
11 A similar result has been obtained by Myers and Philips (1979) in a partial equilibrium model and
by Wasmer and Zenou (2000) and Wasmer and Zenou (2006).
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This is intuitive, because in urban areas, workers are also compensated by rents.
This finding appears to be consistent with empirical studies. For example, it has
been reported that firms located in large cities tend to reimburse less than those
located elsewhere. In the United Kingdom, firms located in London are 50 percent
less likely than firms located outside London to offer a contribution to individual
commuting expenses at the moment of recruitment (RCI 2001).
5 Conclusion
We set out to analyse an urban equilibrium model presuming imperfect labour
markets (bargaining power, search behaviour) and allowing for residential moving
costs aiming to explain the empirical observation that for workers at a particular
workplace (in the current model, the CBD), wages depend on residence location
and therefore on commuting costs (Zax 1991). Labour market imperfections (for
example, search costs) and bargaining between workers and employers play an
essential role in the model. In contrast to models that exclude (labour) market
imperfections, but in line with the empirical literature, workers are partially
compensated for the incurred commuting costs in the labour market. We demon-
strate that labour market power determines the extent to which workers can shift
the burden of commuting expenses onto their employers, but, maybe surprisingly,
the model predicts that workers belonging to groups which have more labour
market power will receive higher wages but less compensation for commuting
costs (since due to the higher wages, the firm’s surplus is less).
One of the implications of the model is that due to residential moving costs and
a single employment centre, rent gradients are less steep than predicted by stan-
dard urban theories in line with a range of empirical studies (Dubin and Sung
1987). Using a theoretical urban economics model with multiple employment
centres, Crane (1996) and Turnbull (1998) both obtained a similar result when
presuming future job site uncertainty and the presence of residential moving costs
that constrain households to live in the same place. In these models, the residential
location is based not only on where the current job is located, but also on the
expectation of where future jobs will be located. Although our model is quite
different from the models of Crane (1996) and Turnbull (1998), in particular, we
assume wage bargaining and only one employment centre, these models share the
assumption of imperfect residential mobility and labour market imperfections.
This seems to imply that the functioning of the labour market may contribute to the
explanation why rent gradients are less steep than predicted by standard urban
theories. More generally, this suggests that the introduction of residential moving
costs combined with labour market imperfections, may be fundamental to our
understanding of the relationship between urban labour and housing markets and
the implications for commuting compensation. Another implication of the model
is that employed individuals total commuting compensation flow derived from the
labour and housing market is less than 100 percent, because they expect to be
compensated for their location later on in the housing market when unemployed.
To conclude, we call for a better understanding of the effects of residential
moving costs on wages, unemployment and rents in urban markets. Our study
256 J. van Ommeren, P. Rietveld
Papers in Regional Science, Volume 86 Number 2 June 2007.
should be seen as a first step towards this goal. More realistic models, for example
urban models that include on-the-job-search, endogenous firm location and con-
gestion, or alternative models with different types of labour market imperfections
(e.g., efficiency wage paying firms), may be needed to confirm our results.
Appendix 1 The wage equation
Equations (11) and (8) imply that:
W U U U t p w t
r
e e
− + − ( ) =
−
− ( )
+
β
β λ1 , (A1)
where Ue denotes the average lifetime income of an unemployed job seeker (the
average is taken over space). The lifetime income of an unemployed job seeker can
be calculated combining (3) and (11), taking expectations using (9).
rU R ce e= − +
−
βθ
β1 , (A2)
where Re denotes the average (or expected) rent. From equation (3) it follows that:
U t U R t R
r q
e
e
( ) − = − ( ) −
+θ
. (A3)
Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
W U w t t R t U t U rU
r
e
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− =
( ) − − ( ) + ( ) −( ) −
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(A4)
Substituting (A2), (A3) and (A4) into (A1), reveals that:
w t t
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(A5)
Reordering gives us wage equation (12).
Appendix 2 Rewriting the wage equation
R t R r q
r q
w t w t t
r q
r q
t te e e e( ) − = +
+ +
( ) − − −( )( ) = − +
+ +
−( )θ
θ λ
θ
βθ λ β , (B1)
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since w(t) - we - (t - te) = ((1 - b) - 1)(t - te) + (1 - b)qq(R(t) - Re)/(r + qq). Sub-
stituting (B1) into (12) gives (13).
References
Ball, MJ (1973) Recent empirical work on the determinants of relative house prices. Urban Studies 10:
213–233
Boehm TP (1981) Tenure choice and expected mobility: a synthesis. Journal of Urban Economics 10:
375–389
Burda MC, Profit S (1996) Matching across space: evidence on mobility in the Czech Republic. Labour
Economics 3: 255–278
Crane R (1996) The influence of uncertain job location on urban form and the journey to work. Journal
of Urban Economics 39: 342–356
DeSalvo JS, Eeckhoudt L (1982) Household behavior under income uncertainty in a monocentric urban
area. Journal of Urban Economics 11: 98–111
Dubin RA, Sung CH (1987) Spatial variation in the price of housing: rent gradients in non-monocentric
cities. Urban Studies 24: 193–204
Fujita M (1989) Urban economic theory, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK
Fujita M, Krugman P (1995) When is the economy monocentric? Van Thünen and Chamberlin unified.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 25: 505–528
Fujita M, Thisse JF, Zenou Y (1997) On the endogenous formation of secondary employment centers
in a city. Journal of Urban Economics 41: 337–357
Hazans M (2004) Does commuting reduce wage disparities? Growth and Change 35: 360–390
Holzer HJ (1991) The spatial mismatch hypothesis: what has the evidence shown? Urban Studies 28:
105–122
Kasper H (1983) Toward estimating the incidence of journey-to-work costs. Urban Studies 20: 197–
208
Manning A (2003) The real thin theory: monopsony in modern labour markets. Labour Economics 10:
105–131
Marimon R, Zilibotti F (1999) Unemployment versus mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemploy-
ment benefits. Economic Journal 109: 266–291
Mortensen DT (1994) The cyclical behaviour of job and worker flows. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 18: 1121–1142
Muth RF (1969) Cities and housing: the spatial pattern of urban residential land use. The University
of Chicago Press Chicago IL
Myers SL, Philips KL (1979) Housing segregation and black employment: another look at the ghetto
dispersal strategy. American Economic Review 69: 248–302
Petrongolo B, Pissarides CA (2001) Looking into the black box: a survey of the matching function.
Journal of Economics Literature 49: 390–431
Pissarides CA (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. MIT Press, second edition, Cambridge
RCI (2001) Recruitment Confidence Index, December 2001. Cranfield School of Management, United
Kingdom
Shapiro C, Stiglitz J (1984) Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. American
Economic Review 74: 433–444
Smith TE, Zenou Y (2003) Spatial mismatch, search effort and urban spatial structure. Journal of
Urban Economics 54: 129–156
Söderberg B, Janssen C (2001) Estimating distance gradients for apartment properties. Urban Studies
38: 61–79
Timothy D, Wheaton WC (2001) Intra-urban wage variation, employment location, and commuting
times. Journal of Urban Economics 50: 338–366
Turnbull G (1998) Housing prices and the residential land use under job site uncertainty. Journal of
Housing Economics 7: 1–20
Van Ommeren JN, Rietveld P (2005) The commuting time paradox. Journal of Urban Economics 58:
437–454
258 J. van Ommeren, P. Rietveld
Papers in Regional Science, Volume 86 Number 2 June 2007.
Vipond J (1980) Intra-urban unemployment differentials in Sydney, 1971. Urban Studies 11: 39–46
Vipond J (1984) The intra-urban unemployment gradient: the influence of location on unemployment.
Urban Studies 21: 377–388
Wasmer E, Zenou Y (2000) Space, search and efficiency. IZA, 181
Wasmer E, Zenou Y (2002) Does city structure affect job search and welfare? Journal of Urban
Economics 51: 515–541
Wasmer E, Zenou Y (2006) Equilibrium search unemployment with explicit spatial frictions. Labour
Economics, forthcoming
Zax JS (1991) Compensation for commutes in labor and housing markets. Journal of Urban Economics
30: 192–207
Zenou Y (2002) How do firms redline workers? Journal of Urban Economics 52: 391–408
Zenou Y, Smith T (1995) Efficiency wages, involuntary unemployment and urban spatial structure.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 25: 547–573
259Compensation for commuting in imperfect urban markets
Papers in Regional Science, Volume 86 Number 2 June 2007.
